Southern Methodist University

SMU Scholar
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2010

Gender, Law, and Detention Policy: Unexpected Effects on the
Most Vulnerable Immigrants
Carla L. Reyes
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law
Author ORCID Identifier:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2448-8309

Recommended Citation
Carla L. Reyes, Gender, Law, and Detention Policy: Unexpected Effects on the Most Vulnerable Immigrants,
25 Wis. J. L. GENDER, & Soc'y 301 (2010)

This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of SMU
Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

GENDER, LAW, AND DETENTION POLICY:
UNEXPECTED EFFECTS ON THE MOST VULNERABLE
IMMIGRANTS
CarlaL. Reyes *
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................

1.

AND IMPETUS FOR MIGRATION

II.

302

CHILDREN IN THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: DEMOGRAPHICS

..............................................

303

PUTTING FEMINIST THEORY TO WORK FOR UACs: LIBERAL
INCLUSION, STRUCTURAL BIAS, AND UAC DETENTION AND LEGAL
306
STANDARDS ....................................................................

Child Advocates Mirror the Feminist Approaches of Liberal
Inclusion and Structural Bias Critique............................... 306
B. Current Detention Policy for UACs: A Complex Network of
309
Facilities and Family Reunification..................................
C. Legal Carve-Outs for UACs: SIJS and UAC Asylum Claims..313
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE NEW UAC DETENTION AND LEGAL
A.

111.

STANDARDS REVEALED: FORMAL EQUALITY UNDERMINED BY
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTS DURING IMPLEMENTATION...................

The Creation of a Preferred Childhood Through Detention
Policy: Child Welfare Principles Confront National Security
Concerns................................................................
B. The Protected Childhood and UAC Legal Standards: No
Room for Gangs or Poverty ..........................................
USING THE UAC EXPERIENCE To REEVALUATE ATTEMPTS TO

314

A.

IV.

315
318

RECOGNIZE CHILDREN AS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS BEARERS IN

320
Best
Interests
a
Policy:
Towards
in
Detention
Treatment
A. Equal
Standard that Individualizes a UAC's Experience ................ 320
B. Realizing the Full Potential of UAC-Specific Legal Relief:
Towards Application of Substantive Law That Protects All
323
Forms of Childhood ...................................................
325
CONCLUSION............................................................................
IMMIGRATION LAW............................................................

J.D., magna cum laude, LL.M. in International and Comparative Law, MPP, Duke
University 2009. 1 would like to thank my husband, Mario, for his unconditional love and
support. 1 would also like to thank the Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender and Society
editorial staff for their professionalism and for the production of this excellent symposium
on a timely and important topic.
*

301

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OFLA W, GENDER & SOCIETY

302

[Vol.
25:2
[o.2:

INTRODUCTION

The United States Department of Homeland Security's enforcement arm,
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, detains around 8,000
unaccompanied alien children each year.' The majority of unaccompanied alien
children detained in the United States originate from Central and South
American countries.2 Nearly 2,000 of these children await the outcome of their
immigration court proceedings in federal custody, while the rest are released to
relatives .3 The children in custody are disproportionately male-nearly 80% in
2008.~
The United States immigration system is especially difficult for children
to navigate. Advocates commonly argue that this difficulty stems largely from
the poor fit of a system designed for adults in light of the reality of the child
immigrant experience. As a result, advocates have traditionally focused their
efforts on modifying the law to include recognition of children as subjects,
rather than objects of immigration law. 5 Such efforts resulted in changes to both
detention policy and substantive immigration law as they relate to a subset of
child immigrants known as Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC).
Using the legal changes created for UAC as a case study, this article
argues that the model of advocacy used by child advocates in U.S. immigration
law and detention policy mirrors the approaches taken by feminist theorists in
international legal theory and gender asylum law. Essentially, current child
advocate efforts focus on liberal inclusion of children's issues in an existing
system and on creating procedures to combat adult-centered bias. This article
investigates evidence that these models are failing, and argues that
implementation of immigration detention policy and access to legal relief vary
1. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Office of Refugee Resettlement, Report to Congress
FY 2007, at 63, available at http://www.acfhhs.gov/programs/orr/data/ORR_2007
_report.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) [hereinafter ORR Report to Congress]. The term
"Unaccompanied Alien Children" is defined as those under the age of eighteen, present in
the United States without a parent or guardian who can care for them, 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)
(2006).
2. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Office of Refugee Resettlement, Unaccompanied
Children's Services, http://www.acfhbs.gov/programs/orr/programs/
unaccompanied
alien -children.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) [hereinafter OR]? Fact Sheet]; see also
WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, HALFWAY HOME: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION

3 (Feb. 2009), http://womensrefugeecommission.org/docs/halfwayhome.pdf.
3. See OR]? Fact Sheet, supra note 1; WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 22.

CUSTODY

4.

CA

POLICIES

AND

C.

HADDAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN:
(2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
ISSUES
19

RL33896_2008013 1.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha, "More than their Share of Sorrows ": -International
Migration law and the Rights of Children, 22 ST. Louis U. PUn. L. REv. 253, 254-55 (2003);
David B. Thronson, You Can't Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child-Centered
Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 58, 67-69 (2006) [hereinafter Thronson, ChildCentered Immigration Law]; David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?: Reconsidering
Conceptions of Children'sRights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 99197 (2002) [hereinafter Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?].
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depending on the construct of childhood assigned to each unaccompanied child
in accordance with his or her gender and related backgrounds.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the phenomena of child
migration to the United States, discussing theories on the impetus of migration
and detailing the demographics of child immigrants. Particular attention is paid
to the subset of child immigrants, UAC, for whom special detention and legal
standards have been developed. Part 11 argues that attempts to modify UAC
detention and legal standards in order to acknowledge a child's agency parallel
similar efforts in international legal feminism and asylum law. Part III reveals
that although efforts to include children as subjects, rather than objects, of
immigration law and to improve detention policy have focused on UACs, the
effectiveness of the reforms is undermined by the social constructs imposed on
UACs during implementation. In order to equalize implementation of detention
policy and immigration law and tailor a UAC's immigration experience to the
individual UAC, rather than to his or her gender and the construct attached to
that gender, Part IV proposes that the Office of Refugee Resettlement update
the principles of the Flores Settlement Agreement 6 by interjecting best interests
considerations at crucial points. Part IV further recommends that immigration
law be amended to further insulate UACs from the Department of Homeland
Security's mandate to combat national security threats and to uphold UAC's
economic rights. The article concludes with a call to child immigrant advocates
to move beyond models of liberal inclusion and systemic bias critique to an
approach that will individualize a child's detention experience and opportunity
for legal relief by combating the artificial social constructs assigned to UACs.
1.

CHILDREN IN THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: DEMOGRAPHICS
AND IMPETUS FOR MIGRATION

Children comprise approximately half of the world's refugees.' An
estimated 500,000 of these children are unaccompanied alien children (UAC).Y
Regarding child migration to the United States, "[a]pproximately 1.8 million
children, some in families and some unaccompanied, live in the United States
without legal immigration authorization." 9 Specifically, scholars estimate that

6. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, Case No. CV 85-4544-RJK (C.D.
Cal. 1996), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/Pdfs/iminiigrants/flores-v-meese_
agreement.pdf [hereinafter Flores Settlement Agreement]. For a discussion of the Flores
Settlement Agreement, see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
7. Laura P. Wexler, Note, Street Children and U.S. Immigration Law: What Should Be
Done?, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 545, 545 (2008).
8. Carolyn J. Seugling, Note, Toward a Comprehensive Response to the Transnational
Migration of Unaccompanied Minors in the United States, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 86 1,
863 (2004).
9. Thronson, Child-CenteredImmigration Law, supra note 5, at 63 (citing JEFFREY S.
PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
MIGRANT POPULATION tN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON TH-E MARCH 2005 CURRENT

POPULATION SURVEY 8 (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6l.pdf).
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between 43,000 and 48,000 undocumented UACs enter the United States each
year.10 Of these, over 35,000 children come from contiguous countries and
undergo immediate return to their country of origin."' The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) detains approximately 8,000 additional UACs each
year.'12 Of those detained, around 2,000 are required to remain in the custody of
the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for the duration of their immigration
proceedings, while the other 60% are released to relatives.'"
Eighty-five percent of children in ORR custody are between the ages of
fourteen and eighteen and hail from the Central American countries of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.'14 Interestingly, nearly 76% of the children
in custody are male.1 5 Conceivably, male and female UACs may be driven to
transnational migration for different reasons, which, in turn, may affect the
statistical disparity seen in UAC detention facilities. As such, an examination
of the impetus for UACs' migration to the United States is necessary.
At the outset, it is undeniable that the "children's motivations are
complex, their stories unique."1 Initial studies on UACs singled out wars,
refuigee situations, famines, and natural disasters as the main reasons children
attempt transnational migration separately from their parents. 17 As the
phenomena grew, studies recognized that many UACs also migrate to flee
"abuse, abandonment, neglect, or violations of their human rights such as
forced prostitution, child marriage, female genital mutilation, and
conscription."'" Still other UACs undertake transnational migration out of

10. AmAy THOMPSON, CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY PRIORITIES, A CHILD ALONE AND WITHOUT
PAPERS: A REPORT ON THE RETURN AND REPATRIATION OF UNACCOMPANIED UNDOCUMENTED
7 (2008), http://www.cppp.org/repatriation/
BY THE UNITED STATES
(estimating 43,000); SONIA
A%2OChild%20Alone%20and%20Without%20Papers.pdf
CHILDREN

NAZARIO, ENRIQUE'S JOURNEY: THE STORY OF A Boy's DANGEROUS ODYSSEY TO REUNITE

WITH His MOTHER 5 (2006) (estimating 48,000).
11. THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 7.

12.
FY 2006
13.
14.
15.
16.

ORR Report to Congress, supra note 1, at 63 (showing over 8,000 UACs entered in
and FY 2007); WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 4 (estimating 8,300).
WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 22.
HADDAL, supra note 4, at 20.
Id. at 19.
THOMPSON, supranote 10, at 7.

17. EVERETT M. RESSLER, NEIL BOOTHBY & DANIEL J. STEINBOCK, UNACCOMPANIED
CHILDREN: CARE AND PROTECTION IN WARS, NATURAL DISASTERS, AND REFUGEE
MOVEMENTS 9-12 (1988).

18. Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The Treatment of
UnaccompaniedRefugee and Immigrant Children in the United States, 45 HARv. C.R.-C. L.
L. REv. 247, 248 (2010) (citing U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Questions Relating to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced
Persons and H-umanitarian Questions: Assistance to Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, 4,
10, 13, U.N. Doc A/52/273 (Aug. 7, 1997) available at http://www.un.org/
documents! ga/docsls2lPlenaryla52-273.htm); see also Greta Lynn Uehling, The
InternationalSmuggling of Children: Coyotes, Snakeheads, and the Politics of Compassion,
81 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 833, 840 (2008) (listing flight from human rights abuses, armed
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economic necessity, a motivation more frequently expected to compel adults.' 9
Other children travel to the United States alone in order to reunite with parents
who had travelled before them.2
While some of the motivations prompting unaccompanied child migration
are gender specific, such as female genital mutilation or forced marriage,
migration theorists increasingly posit that no matter their gender, "[w]hat
usually precipitates a child's departure is that fragile (or untenable) care
arrangements break down in a process that often involves abuse, abandonment,
or neglect., 2'1This remains true whether a child flees abusive parents in his or
her country of origin, seeks to reunite with non-abusive parents in the
destination country, or has lived alone for many years and is fleeing war,
human rights abuses, or other mistreatment.2 Admittedly, the social science
literature focuses on the extent to which globalization has increasingly forced
an active decision-making role upon children in questions of migration,
whether alone or in a family setting.23 The issue of variance in the decisionmaking process by gender has not yet been examined systematically. However,
the fact that every specific impetus for child migration can be said to reflect a
break-down in the child's care arrangements suggests that the underlying
impetus for migration fails to explain the large disparity in treatment received
in U.S. immigration detention policy and substantive law along gender lines.
Instead, disparate treatment stems from a system that, at its core, views children

conflict, gang or forced military recruitment, female genital mutilation, forced marriages,
prostitution, and life as street children as impetus for child migration).
19. Wexler, supra note 7; see also Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights,
Criminalization, and the TransnationalMigration of UnaccompaniedChildren, 7 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUN'DTABLE

269, 278-79 (2000) (describing the calculations families undertake when

deciding to send a child abroad unaccompanied by a parent or guardian, noting that it
includes situations "where children are sent away to improve their life chances, whether
through education at boarding schools in metropolitan countries or work in -urban
sweatshops"); Julia Meredith Hess & Dianna Shandy, Kids at the Crossroads: Global
Childhood and the State, 81 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 765, 772 (2008) ("[lIt is often a desire to
provide economic support for family members at home that compels these youth to
migrate."); Uehling, supra note 18, at 840 ("Still other children leave in search of work to
support their families.").
20. Paula S. Fass, Children in Global Migrations, J. Soc. HIsT. 937, 942 (2005)
("Family migration has never been a process in which all members of the family necessarily
move together."). See generally, Sarah Horton, Consuming Childhood: "Lost" and "Ideal"
Childhoods as a Motivation for Migration, 81 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 925 (2008) (providing
several narratives of families migrating to the United States in stages).
2 1. Uehling, supra note 18, at 840.
22. See Marjorie Faulstich Orellana, Barre Thorne, Anna Chee & Wan Shun Eva
Lam, Transnational Childhoods: The Participation of Children in Processes of Family
Migration, 48 SOC. PROBS. 572, 578-83 (200 1).
23. See, e.g., Anna Kirova, Book Review, 8 J. INT'L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 127
(2007) (reviewing CHILDHOOD AND MIGRATION: FROM EXPERIENCE To AGENCY (Jacqueline
Knorr ed., 2005)); Fass, supra note 20, at 948-49; Hess & Shandy, supranote 19, at 767.
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as objects of migration by adults rather than as subjects with their own
24
agency.
PUTTING FEMINIST THEORY TO WORK FOR UACs: LIBERAL
INCLUSION, STRUCTURAL BIAS, ANT) UAC DETENTION AND LEGAL
STANDARDS

II.

Generally speaking, United States immigration law views children as
dependant upon and derivative of their parents. In fact, "[b]y definition in
immigration and nationality law, no 'child' exists except in relation to a
parent.",2 1 Mirroring the historical development of anthropological literature
and migration theory, which "treat[ed] children, in effect, as luggage. . .. [and]

burdens weighing down otherwise mobile adults , 26

U.S.

immigration law

contains "enduring images of children as passive objects or as property." 27 As
such, neither immigration law nor detention policy specifically addressed the
needs of UACs until child welfare advocates actively engaged the issue
beginning in the 1980s.2 Notably, the approach taken by child welfare
advocates since 1980 mirrors the trajectory of feminists lobbying to recognize
women's rights in international law and asylum law .29 However, while feminist
activists and scholars introspectively self-corrected their course when
necessary, child welfare advocates for UACs fail to do so.30 As a result, child
advocates created a detention policy for UACs made of a complex network of
facilities and family reunification that only occasionally serves the UAC's best
interests."' Simultaneously, child advocates carved out two significant UACspecific forms of legal relief.312 These changes to UAC legal standards parallel
the feminist liberal inclusion and structural bias approaches to effecting change
in international law and asylum law, and similarly require that child advocates
engage in a third stage of critique regarding their implementation.
A.

Child Advocates Mirror the FeministApproaches of Liberal Inclusion and
Structural Bias Critique

The noted scholar Karen Engle categorizes the efforts of feminist theory
and literature with regard to international law into three phases: liberal
24. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?, supra note 5, at 995.
25. Thronson, Child-CenteredImmigration Law, supra note 5, at 68; Thronson, Kids
Will Be Kids?, supra note 5, at 991 ("Immigration law never employs the term 'child' except
in relationship to a parent and, therefore, does not conceive of a 'child' existing outside this
relationship.").
26. Orellana et al., supra note 22, at 578.
27. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?, supra note 5, at 995.

28.

HADAAL,

29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See

supra note 4, at 2.

infra Part.
infra Part.
infra Part.
infra Part.

Il.A.
hIA.
II.B.
II.C.
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inclusion, structural bias critique, and third world feminist approaches.3 Engle
describes the liberal inclusion phase as one in which "[t]he task of feminist
scholarship in international law . . . was to add women to human rights
protections guaranteed under international law."3 The structural bias phase, on
the other hand, argued that "inclusion of women into human rights law was
impossible" because international law and institutions were "structured to
permit, even require, women's subordination. 35 Finally, Engle attributes
critiques of the previous two approaches-for failure to include or accurately
represent third world women-to a phase of scholarship she terms "third world
approaches."3 According to Engle, liberal inclusion succeeded in so far as
there "are increasing numbers of women involved in both the academic and
practical pursuits of international human rights law, and women's rights have
3
become a part of the mainstream human rights and humanitarian law agenda." 1
Structural bias critiques brought issues such as trafficking, female genital
mutilation, and wartime rape to the forefront of international human rights
discourse .3 ' Finally, third world critiques succeeded in introducing issues of
cultural bias and the idea of gender as a larger social construct to the
discussion . 39 Essentially, each phase identified by Engle contributed to the
forward progress of women's rights in international law. Notably, Engle herself
argues that the stages she identifies are not unique to any particular subset of
literature.4
Indeed, authors similarly describe the success of feminist scholars in
migration studies and asylum law in "help[ing] women move to active
conceptual presence."AI Feminist scholars have produced a wealth of literature
documenting "the discrimination against women in asylum and refugee law,
and speciffying] needed reforms." 42 This literature argues that the root of the
discrimination lies in the devaluation of women's political activities and "the
neglect of the kinds of private-sphere persecutions most often afflicting
women."A3 Advocacy efforts have focused on incorporating gender issues into
asylum law and other forms of immigration relief. With the addition of claims
33. Karen Engle, InternationalHuman Rights and Feminisms: When Discourses Keep
Meeting, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 47, 48 (Doris Buss &
Amnbreena Manji eds., 2005).

34.

Id. at 49.

3 5. Id.
3 6. Id.
37. Id. (citing SARI Kouvo, MAKING JUST RIGHTS? MAINSTREAMING WOMEN'S HUMAN
RIGHTS AND A GENDER PERSPECTIVE 200-98 (2004)).
3 8. Id.
39. See id. at 50.
40. Id. at 48.
4 1. Orellana et al., supra note 22, at 5 78.
42. Kitty Calavita, Gender, Migration, and Law: Crossing Borders and Bridging
Disciplines, 40 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 104, 111 (2006).
43. Id. (citing HEAVEN CRAWLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS 18-21
(2001)).
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under the Violence Against Women Act"4 and the recognition of gender as a
potential basis for membership in a particular social group,"5 this model of
liberal inclusion achieved significant successes. Increasingly, however, scholars
have embraced the idea that an analysis of gender, migration, and law involves
more than a simple recognition of how the "male versus female divide" affects
migration or immigration law and its processes. Instead, the literature
frequently emphasizes gender's "dynamic nature," recognizing that "gendered
ideologies and practices change as human beings. ...
cooperate or struggle with
each other, with their pasts, and with the structures of changing economic,
political, and social worlds linked through their migrations."" Gender is thus
increasingly conceived as a social construct imposed on individuals, together
7
with other preconceived notions pertaining to race, culture, and social class,"
and the literature continues to struggle to propose modifications to the current
legal paradigm that addresses these constructs."
Furthermore, scholars and advocates increasingly recognize that both
"[w]omen and children '.s immigration stories are rarely told outside of the

44. The Violence Against Women act provides, among others, the following forms of
relief. (1) the right of undocumented battered spouses of lawful permanent residents or U.S.
citizens to self-petition for permanent residency; (2) cancellation of removal for battered
spouses who have lived continuously in the United States for three years and show that
removal will result in extreme hardship to themselves or their children; and (3) U-Visas for
victims of violent crime who are helpful in making a case against the offender. See
Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1 154(a)(1) (2006); 8 C.F.R.
§204.2(c), (e) (2010) (self-petition provisions); Immigration and Nationality Act §
240A(b)(2), 8. U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2); 8 C.F.R. §1240.58 (VAWA cancellation provisions);
Immigration and Nationality Act §l0l(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 11I0l(a)(15)(U); Immigration
and Nationality Act §214(p), 8 U.S.C. § 11 84(p); 8 C.F.R. §214.14 (U-Visa provisions).
45. Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996). For further guidance on womenspecific asylum claims, see Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, U.S. Dep't of Justice, on
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women to all INS
Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators (May 26, 1995) (on file with author), reprinted

in 7

INT'LJ. REFUGEE L.

700 (1995).

46. Katharine M. Donato, Donna Gabaccia, Jennifer Holdaway, Martin Manalansan,
IV & Patricia R. Pessar, A Glass Half Full? Gender in Migration Studies, 40 INT'L
MIGRATION REv. 3, 6 (2006).
47. JUDITH LORBER, PARtADOXES OF GENDER 13 (1994) (arguing that "gender is
constantly created and re-created out of human interaction, out of social life, and is the
texture and order of that social life . . .. gender, like culture, is a human production that
depends on everyone constantly 'doing gender"'..).
48. See generally, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Asylum in a Different Voice? Judging

Immigration Claims and Gender, in

REFUGEE

ROULETTE:

DISPARITIES

IN ASYLUM

REFORm 202-26 (Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I.
Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag eds. 2009); Deborah Anker, Lauren Gilbert & Nancy Kelly,
Women Whose Governments Are Unable or Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection
from Domestic Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, I I GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 709 (1997); Monica Boyd & Elizabeth Grieco, Women and Migration:
IncorporatingGender into InternationalMigration Theory, MIGRATtON INFO. SOURCE (Mar.
1, 2003), http://www.migationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfin?id=106.
ADJUDICATION AND

PROPOSALS

FOR
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masculine-oriented narrative of family unification." 49 The work of child welfare
advocates in making children subjects rather than objects of immigration law
mirrors that of feminist scholars in international law and in gender and asylum
law. Namely, advocates began with a liberal inclusion model and then
investigated a structural bias paradigm. With its emphasis on bringing child
welfare principles into immigration law, the liberal inclusion model succeeded
in several areas but only for a subset of children-UACs. 0 In detention policy,
an elaborate system of child-specific detention facilities provides UACs with a
specific set of rights created via litigation by child welfare advocates."' In
immigration law, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status interjects a child-specific
form of legal relief into an otherwise adult-centered system, while new
procedural requirements for UAC asylum claims seem to respond to the
structural bias critique that the current process is incapable of fairly
adjudicating children's claims.5 There exists, however, a notable failure to
engage in discourse regarding constructs of childhood and gender, which
undermines these successes by allowing significant problems of
implementation to go unchecked 5.
B.

CurrentDetention Policy for UA Cs. A Complex Network of Facilitiesand
Family Reunification

A series of lawsuits against the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) alleged mistreatment of UACs during their immigration-related
detention.5 Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the

INS policies. 55 However, the child welfare advocates handling the suit later
reached a settlement agreement with the INS, known as the Flores Settlement
Agreement, which provided UACs certain rights relating to their detention,
release, and repatriation.5 The Flores Settlement Agreement serves as the

primary foundation for UAC detention policy,5 7 'and the Trafficking Victims

49. Isabel Guzman Molina, Rescuing Elicin: Gender and Race in Stories of Children's

Migration, in IMMIGRANT

RIGHTS INTHE SHADOWS OF CITIZENSHIP
ed., 2008) (emphasis added).

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

179, 180 (Rachel Ida Buff

See infra Part II.B-C.
See infra Part lI.B.
See infra Part 1I.C.
See infra Part Ill.
1-ADDAL, supra note 4, at 2.
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
HADDAL, supra note 4, at 2.

57. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, DIVISION OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN'S
SERVICES, DRAFT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 9 (on file with author) ("The Flores
Settlement Agreement is the principal guiding document for the standards of care for UAC
until the ORR publishes its regulations."); see also

HADDAL,

supra note 4, at 2;

HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS:
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN DETAINED BY THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 30 (1997).
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Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) recently codified many of its
58
provisions.
Essentially, the Flores Settlement Agreement provides UACs with the
right to legal assistance, adequate medical, dental, reproductive, and mental
health services, education and recreation, rights of privacy, right to adequate
interpretation services, freedom of expression and religion, the right to be
detained in the least restrictive setting, and the right to prompt family
60
reunification where possible.5 9 In 2003, the Homeland Security Act (HSA)
transferred the care and custody of UACs from the INS to the Department of
Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). 6' The
transfer aimed, like many of the other changes to the immigration system
enacted by the HSA, to separate conflicting mandates. In the case of UACs, the
transfer aimed "to decouple prosecution from care."6 Prior to the transfer,
about one-third of children in INS custody were held "in juvenile detention
facilities intended for the incarceration of youth offenders."6 The transfer of
the caretaker role to ORR also resulted in increased emphasis on the Flores
mandate to house UACs in the least restrictive setting commensurate with the
safety, emotional, and physical needs of the childf64
In order to meaningfully fulfill this mandate, ORR houses UACs in a
complex network of shelter facilities. Each of the ORR facilities falls along a
continuum of security from foster care, the least restrictive placement option, to
secure facilities, the most restrictive placement . 6 ' Two types of foster care
placements exist: short-term and long-term. ORR generally reserves short-term
foster care placements for children under the age of twelve, pregnant teens, and
groups of siblings . 66 Long-term foster care usually serves as a child's second
placement, after determining that family reunification is not an option for the
child and that the child's immigration case is likely to be of considerable
duration .6 1 Shelter care facilities follow a group-home model and house those
UACs who cannot be placed in foster-care, but who are not considered flight
risks or in need of intensive services . 6 1 Staff-secure facilities "provide a
heightened level of staff supervision, communication, and services to control

58. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-45 7, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22
U.S.C.). Specifically, see § 235(c)(2), § 235(c)(6).
59. Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 6.
60. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
61. See id. § 462.
supra note 2, at 1.

62.

WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N,

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 3.
See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 38.
Id. at 42-49; see also WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 56.
WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 56.
Id.
Id.
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problem behavior and prevent runaways." 69 Staff-secure facilities generally
sport a secure perimeter that appears similar to correctional facilities, but do not
typically include significant restraining devices inside the facility."' Finally,
secure facilities, the most restrictive setting in the ORR continuum of care, 7
"maintains a physically secure structure. . .. in addition to a heightened level of
staff supervision, communication and services to control problem behavior and
prevent escapes."7
Currently, the ORR Manual requires providers to "regularly assess"
whether a transfer to a less restrictive facility is appropriate for any given
UAC .7 ' The TVPRA heightens this requirement for UACs initially placed in
secure facilities, requiring that the appropriateness of such placements be re-

evaluated on a monthly

basis. 74

ORR undertakes such "step-down" transfers

under the auspices of a "best-interest of the child" rationale .7 ' Notably,
however, few jurisdictions contain the full continuum of facilities offered by
ORR. 76 As a result, a step-down transfer (or, conceivably, a step-up transfer)
may result in a transfer across jurisdictions, resulting in a disruption in the

69.

OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 45.

70.

Id.

The DUCS Manual provides a list of criteria to consider in assessing the appropriateness of a
staff-secure

placement. These criteria include inappropriate

sexual

behavior, disruptive acts,

such as destruction of property and non-specific threats to commit a violent act that do not
involve a significant risk to harm another person. In practice, children with an offender
history that is not serious, children who are flight risks and children who have displayed
disruptive behavior in a shelter program are also considered for staff-secure placement.
WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 57. For the specific list of criteria, see OFFICE
OF REFUGEE RESET-rLEMENT, supra note 57, at 45-46
71. WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 57.
72. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 47.
The DUCS Manual considers secure placement to be appropriate for
children (i) charged with or convicted of a crime or adjudicated as
delinquent; (ii) who have committed or threatened acts of crime or
violence while in DUCS custody; (iii) who have engaged in
unacceptably disruptive acts; (iv) who are a flight risk; or (v) who need
extra security for their own protection. This placement criteria may be
narrowed in the coming months as the TVPRA mandates that children
should not be placed in secure facilities absent a deterninationthat the
child poses a danger to self or others or has been charged with a
criminaloffense.
WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 57 (emphasis in the original). For the specific
language of the criteria, see OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 47-48.
73. WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 57.
74. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(c)(2), 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 22 U. S.C.).
75. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 136 ("An UAC will be
transferred for child welfare reasons when it is determined that another care provider is
better suited to care for the particular needs of a child.").
76. See WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 54-55.
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provision of legal and other services." 7 Notably absent from the agency's
analysis of the child's "best-interests" is a consideration of the effect of a
transfer on the UAC's legal case: "The ORR will consider the UAC's age,
gender, immigration status, criminal background, potential for family
reunification, mental or physical conditions requiring special services, past
behavior in an ORR program as well as review supporting documentation when
making transfer decisions." 78
The additional mandate to prioritize family reunification overlays the
entirety of this complex system of ORR facilities and transfers. In accordance
with the Flores Settlement Agreement, when it is determined:
that the detention of the minor is not required either to secure his or
her timely appearance before. ...the immigration court, or to ensure
the minor's safety or that of others the INS shall release a minor from
its custody without unnecessary delay, in the following order of
preference, to: a parent; a legal guardian; an adult relative ... an
adult individual or entity designated by the parent or legal guardian
as capable and willing to care for the minor's well-being . . .; a
licensed program willing to accept legal custody; or an adult
individual or entity seeking custody . . . when it appears that there is
no other likely alternative to long term detention and family
reunification does not appear to be a reasonable possibility.7
.;

Around 60% of all children in ORR custody are released via the family
8s. Understandably, legal services providers generally do
reunficaionproc
not assign children expected to be released or reunified an attorney while in
custody. 8' Thus, as a direct result of the priority placed on family reunification
by child welfare advocates, an estimated 70% of children "released from
custody to a sponsor do not have an attorney and must appear before an
immigration judge by themselves."8
The perception of a particular UAC as eligible for initial placement in a
lesser restrictive setting, any subsequent step-up or step-down transfers, and the
prioritization of family reunification undoubtedly affect a child's detention
experience, and eventually, his or her legal case. Notably, discussion of the
possible effects of each of these decisions on the child's legal case remains

77. Linda A. Piwowarezyk, Our Responsibility to Unaccompanied and Separated
Children in the United States: A Helping Hand, 15 B.U. PUB. INT~. L.J. 263, 274 (2006)
(citing DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF DHS'
27
(2005),
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/
JUVENILE
ALIENS
RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR
assets/mgmtrpts/IG_-05-45_Sep05.pdf).
78. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 136.
79. Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 9-10 (internal quotations omitted).
80. WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 22.
8 1. Id. at 22-23.

82. Id. at 23.
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3
absent from the criteria invariably used by ORR to make such determinations .1
In addition, when ORR bases determinations on criteria such as "flight risk" or
"disruptive behavior," the cultural constructs imposed upon each UAC by their
ORR care providers 84 Will influence the outcomes, and in turn, influence the
UAC's overall detention experience and access to legal services.

C.

Legal Carve-Outsfor UA Cs: SIJS and UA C Asylum Claims

In addition to pursuing a liberal inclusion model with regard to UAC
detention policy, child welfare advocates sought to incorporate child welfare
principles in immigration law. The first of two successes in this regard, Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), provides undocumented children a path to
legal permanent residency" if a state juvenile court has declared the child a
dependent, or placed the child in the custody of a state agency or person, and
has done so because: (1) "reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant's
parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis
found under State law," and (2) it is not in the child's best interests to return to
his or her country of nationality.816 SIjS is often considered a "significant first
step toward a more child-centered approach to thinking about children in
immigration law,",87 especially because it is "the only provision in immigration
law that expressly incorporates a best interests of the child standard into its
eligibility criteria."8 8 By creating SIJS, child advocates sought to recognize
UACs' agency by adding them to the existing system, rather than
fundamentally altering the existing system. Such an approach reflects a liberal
inclusion model.
When child welfare advocates approached the issue of creating childcentered asylum law, however, their tactics spoke to a structural bias critique
model rather than one of liberal inclusion. Namely, believing immigration
courts and immigration judges simply unable to adapt a system originally
designed for the adjudication of adult claims, advocates pursued the creation of
a wholly separate process in which to adjudicate UAC claims. 89 The TVPRA
provides the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) with
initial jurisdiction over UAC asylum claims, affording UACs a less adversarial
setting for the adjudication of their cases. 90 If a UAC's claim is denied by

83. See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 136
84. See infra Part 111.
85. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 1(b) (2010).
86. 8 U.S.G.S § 11O1(a)(27)(J)(i) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010).
87. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?, supra note 5, at 1008.
88. Id. at 1004.
89. Young & McKenna, supra note 18, at 252-53 (describing the "improperly tailored
forms of immigration relief available to unaccompanied children").
90. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(7)(C) 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.).
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USCI5, the TVPRA grants the UAC an additional opportunity to press his or

her case before the immigration judge. 9'
The SIJS and UAC asylum provisions have been described as "progress. .
toward acknowledging the unique challenges that arise when a child arrives in
the United States without his or her traditional caregiver." 92 However, the wellknown principle that the "law on the books" and the "law in action" rarely
coincide93 equally applies to the substantive immigration law applicable to
UACs. While formally, both SIJS and the procedural changes for UAC asylum
claims made strides in recognizing UACs' agency and child-specific needs,
social constructs of good and bad childhoods assigned to UACs by ORR
caretakers, immigration judges, and policy-makers has undermined their

implementation.
Ill.

94

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE NEW UAC DETENTION AND LEGAL
STANDARDS REVEALED: FORMAL EQUALITY UNDERMINED BY
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Although child advocates succeeded in formally recognizing UACs as
subjects of immigration law by providing UACs certain protections while in
96
immigration custody, 95 better protecting the child welfare interests of UACS
by shifting primary care for UACs away from DHS and toward the Office of
Refugee Resettlement, 97 and carving out UAC-specific forms of legal relief,
their use of the liberal inclusion and structural bias models caused significant
problems. Specifically, child advocates interjected child welfare principles into
a detention system used foremost as a tool to combat the national security
threat of undocumented immigration. As a result, implementation of detention
policy and access to UAC-specific legal relief vary depending on the construct
of childhood assigned to each UAC in accordance with their gender and related
backgrounds.9 Ultimately, the current models of liberal inclusion and structural
bias critique used by child welfare advocates with regards to UACs are
insufficient, and advocates should follow the lead of their feminist counterparts
by accounting for and combating the cultural constructs undermining the
implementation of child welfare reforms.

91. Id. § 235(d)(7).
92. Young & McKenna, supra note 18, at 260.
93. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration, in MIGRATION
THEORY: TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 187, 191 (Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Hollifield
eds., 2000). This distinction between law-in-action and law-on-the-books is also prominently
discussed in literature on Comparative Law.
94. See infra Part Ill.
95. See supra, Part IB.
96. WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 1-3; see also OFFICE OF REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 38.
97. See 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2006).
98. See infra Part IlA.
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The Creation of a PreferredChildhood Through Detention Policy: Child
Welfare Principles Confront NationalSecurity Concerns

The system created as a direct result of the liberal inclusion and structural
bias models suffers from conflicting internal agendas. Namely, the conviction
"that children must be treated with the utmost care and attention,"99 as
embodied in the Flores Settlement Agreement and the TVPRA, conflicts with
the general view of undocumented adolescents "as potential juvenile
offenders"' 00 or as general "security risks to the United States."'0 ' As a result of
this incongruence,102 some of the most important factors in the care, long-term
permanency planning, and protection of UACs remain undervalued.
Specifically, access to legal services is undervalued in comparison to family
reunification; the detention facilities' step-up/step-down procedures sacrifices
continuity of care; and ORR remains the only constant entity providing best
interests determinations,' 03 resulting in a conflict of interest to the detriment of
UACs.
First, while the Flores Settlement Agreement made family reunification a
mandated priority for immigration detention facilities, current implementation
of that priority often comes at the sacrifice of a UAC's access to legal services.
This tension is a direct result of the liberal inclusion model used by child
advocates in lobbying for reform. Child advocates "have not appreciated the
importance of securing long-term legal protections for residency status,
preferring to concentrate on the pressing welfare issues at hand."' 0
Furthermore, the directive from the Flores Settlement Agreement to house
UACs in the least restrictive setting while awaiting the conclusion of their
immigration proceedings often interrupts the continuity of care UACs receive
regarding psychological, medical, and legal services.10 5 Because few, if any,
jurisdictions contain the complete continuum of shelter facilities in close
geographic proximity, a step-up or step-down decision may cause UACs to be
transferred across the country.'106 ORR makes such decisions without consulting
legal providers, which often causes significant disruption in the child's ability
to work through past traumatic experiences in therapy due to interruption of

99. Uehling, supra note 18, at 844.
100. Id. at 843.
10 1. Id. at 837.
102. Also described by one author as follows: "a janus-faced attitude to children in the
international migration context: concern over particular vulnerability and need for protection
combines with suspicion and hostility towards their unregulated, uncontrolled status compassion for deprivation merges into suspicion of delinquency." Bhabha, supra note 5, at
274.
103. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
104. Bhabha, supra note 5, at 267.
105. Piwowarczyk, supra note 77, at 274-76.
106. Id. at 274 (citing DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A
REVIWw

OF

DHS'

RESPONSIBILITIES

FOR

JUVENILE

http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG-05-45_SepO5.pdf).

ALIENS

27

(2005).
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care.107 This poses a significant problem for male UACs, who are more likely
to act out after trauma, and who are already viewed as a greater security threat
than their female UAC counterparts because of potential increased gang

affiliations.108

Finally, many child advocates call for the use of the "best interests of the
child" standard in immigration law,' 09 however, for UACs, the only consistent
source of such determinations have been the Division of Unaccompanied
Minors Field Coordinators. "0 Field Coordinators are ostensibly charged with
making "independent" best interests recommendations to ORR when issues of
custody and placement are being decided."' While Field Coordinators are
directly hired by outside agencies, such as Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee
Services or the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Field
Coordinators are ORR-funded contract positions."12 The relative level of
independence of such offices should be viewed with deep suspicion.
Ultimately,, these three major problems, routine parts of the UAC
detention experience, reveal the systemic failure of the liberal inclusion model.
ORR's implementation of the Flores principles is "built upon a construction of
American childhood which profoundly shapes the experiences of these young
migrants..."". In particular, ORR "protects some childhoods more than
otes"' While some argue that ORR prefers childhoods based on an ethnic

107. See id. at 276 ("The U.S. must create a continuum of care for juvenile aliens in
order to ensure their well-being.").
108. See Monisha Bansal, Chertoff: Street Gangs a Threat to National Security,
CNSNEWS.COM,

July 7, 2008, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/22826 (identifying MS-

13 and other Central American gangs as a national security threat); see also James C.
Howell, Youth Gangs: An OverVieW, JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention), Aug. 1998, at I ("Male gang members
outnumber females by a wide margin, and this span is greater in late adolescence than in
early adolescence.").
109. See, e.g., Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a 'Best Interests of the Child'
Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE Hum. RTs. DEV. L.J. 120 (2009)
(arguing that the best interests approach be used to safeguard all children "directly affected"
by immigration proceedings - even those affected only by their parents' removal
proceedings); Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best
Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219,
235 (2006) (arguing that a best interests approach for UACs requires "direct representation,
advocacy efforts and a central role in shaping their future").
1 10. Notably, the Immigrant Children's Advocacy Project, based in Chicago, does
strive to provide best interests recommendations for some children in certain circumstances.
See Piwowarczyk, supra note 77, at 293-94 for a brief description of the project. See also the
organization's website at http://www.immigrantchildadvocacy.orglindex.shtml.

Ill1. See

LUTHERAN

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE,

FREQUENTLY

ASKED

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DIVISION OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN'S SERVICES (DUCS)
(2006), http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=1 96 12&linkid=146817.
112. Id.
113. Hess & Shandy, supra note 19. at 768.
114. Uehling, supra note 18, at 837.
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hierarchy,"' this article submits that the preference for certain socially
constructed childhoods is more subtle and general than simple ethnic bias.
Rather, the childhood that is perceived as most vulnerable to loss is the
childhood more protected by implementation of detention policy" 6 -namely,
that perceived more as a victim and less as a security threat.
Female UACs are thought to be the most vulnerable to trafficking and
other forms of abuse," 7 and, like female refugees in general, are depicted as
more passive and less resourceful."' As a result, female UACs more readily fit
the criteria required for placement in foster care settings rather than staff-secure
or secure facilities.' ' Male UACs, on the other hand, are more often suspected
of deviancy,120 more likely to be perceived as delinquent or suspected of gang
connections, and thus more likely to fulfill the criteria for bed spaces in staffsecure and secure facilities.' 2 '1 Furthermore, one study of Honduran children
removed from the United States found that "though girls represent one-third to
one-fourth of the unaccompanied Honduran minors in U.S. Custody,
22
proportionately fewer girls than boys appear to be subject to removal."'1
Essentially, UAC detention policy uses gender as shorthand for distinguishing
"the delinquent child whose agency and choice make him more accountable for
his actions and more liable for control from the victimized child whose
vulnerability and manipulation by others make him less responsible and more
eligible for assistance,,' 2 1 with male UACs assigned a construct endowed with
more agency, and female UACs one with less.
115. See, e.g., id. at 8 39.
116. As one author notes, "Today, our western commitment to child protection often
incubates a similar sense of superiority which lays a claim to virtue in the vision of a proper
childhood." Fass, supra note 20, at 939.
117. Gender Equality: Trafficking in Human Misery, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION
FUN.D, http://www.unfpa.org/gender/violencel.htmn (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) ("Because of
their subordinate position, women and girls are most vulnerable.").
118. See Loveness H. Schafer, True Survivors: East African Refugee Women, 49
AFRICA TODAY 29, 30 (2002).
119. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 57, at 42-49 (listing foster care
criteria as including low flight risk, long anticipated duration of immigration case, and lack
of reunification options, and secure facility criteria as prior criminal history, disruptive or
violent behavior, and flight risk).
120. Areti Georgopoulos, Beyond the Reach of Juvenile Justice: The Crisis of
UnaccompaniedImmigrant Children Detained by the United States, 23 LAW & INEQ. 117,
117-19 (2005) (describing detention conditions in which "many officials don't understand
the difference between a juvenile offender and an unaccompanied child," which is
"insensitive to their needs and in violation of their rights").
12 1. See Bansal, supra note 108; see also Howell, supra note 108.
122. CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY PRIORITES, A CHILD ALONE A.ND WITHOUT PAPERS
http://www.cppp.org/repatriation/
6,
METHODOLOGY
REPORT
BACKGROUNDER:
Backgrounder5.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 20 10).
123. Susan J. Terrio, New Barbarians at the Gates of Paris? Prosecuting
Undocumented Minors in the Juvenile Court-The Problem of the 'Petits Roumains', 81
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 873, 876 (2008) (describing the attribution of particular constructs to
undocumented minors by the government of France).
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The ProtectedChildhood and UA C Legal Standards:No Room for Gangs
or Poverty

The creation of different cultural constructs for male and female UACs,
combined with the increased value given to the construct of childhood assigned
to female UACs also affects the application of substantive law to UAC asylum
claims. For example, the view of the UACs, and particularly male UACs, as
pertaining to a childhood construct of deviance and menace, has rendered gangbased asylum claims effectively useless.124 Furthermore, the constructs of
childhood assigned to UACs through immigration law systematically
undervalue the economic rights of children. There exists no basis in asylum law
for a claim on the basis of deprivation of economic rights. 125 Furthermore,
because most state dependency law precludes findings of dependency on the
sole basis of economic neglect,126 most UACs cannot pursue SUJS as a method
for vindicating economic rights. Many families send children abroad in "search
for childhoods free from material want and adult responsibilities"' 2 7 in response
to the "global flows of media, goods and people [that] have spread bourgeois
images of a commercialized childhood.",128 Upon their arrival, however, United
States immigration law refuses to recognize the "lost childhood"129 from which
they seek refuge as a legitimate form of suffering. The social constructs of

124. See Susan M. Akram, Are They Human Children or Just Border Rats?, 15 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 187, 191 (2006) ("Government counsel take aggressive positions in children's

cases, opposing the interpretation of the grounds of asylum to include special types of
persecution affecting children, such as fleeing gang violence, domestic violence, or street
violence.").
125. See M. Beth Morales Singh, Note, To Rescue, Not Return: An International
Human Rights Approach to Protecting Child Economic Migrants Seeking Refulge in the
Un ited States, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 5 19-25 (2008).
126. See id. at 527 (explaining that under New York state law, a finding of neglect
cannot be entered by a dependency court solely because the parents were not financially able
to care for the child). For another example of state dependency law excluding economic
grounds as a basis of neglect, see WASH. REv. CODE § 26.44.020 (2008 & Supp. 2009):
'Negligent treatment or maltreatment' means an act or a failure to act, or
the cumulative effects of a pattern of conduct, behavior, or inaction, that
evidences a serious disregard of consequences of such magnitude as to
constitute a clear and present danger to a child's health, welfare, or
safety, including but not limited to conduct prohibited under RCW
9A.42. 100. When considering whether a clear and present danger exists,
evidence of a parent's substance abuse as a contributing factor to
negligent treatment or maltreatment shall be given great weight. The fact
that siblings share a bedroom is not, in and of itself, negligent treatment
or maltreatment. Poverty, homelessness, or exposure to domestic
violence as defined in RCW 26.50.0 10 that is perpetrated against
someone other than the child does not constitute negligent treatment or
maltreatment in and of itself.
127. Horton, supranote 20, at 940-41.
128. Id. at 926.
129. For further discussion on the notion of a "lost childhood," see generally Id.
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foreign childhoods as belonging to victims or national security threats 130
contain no space for the vindication of a UAC's economic rights or the reality
of their childhood experience in the country of origin. Essentially, in the realm
of immigration law, the liberal inclusion model, which interjected principles of
child welfare as perceived through an American cultural lens, only continues to
strip children of agency in immigration proceedings by assigning to male and
female UACs foreign cultural constructs and failing to recognize the cultural
and social reality of the UAC's life in their country of origin.
The creation of special detention procedures for UACs and the enactment
of the SIJ statute and procedural changes to UAC asylum claims are strong
strides in advancing the rights of this subset of children in immigration
proceedings. Most child advocates, however, continue to call for two things: (1)
that such considerations be expanded to all children, not just UACs, and (2)
that further steps toward liberal inclusion be made via provision of legal
representation and appointed child advocates.131 While laud able, these calls to
action do not go far enough because the evidence suggests that the system,
32
created under the models of liberal inclusion and structural bias critique,1
imposes a construct of gender and childhood that affects a child's immigration
detention experience and opportunity for legal relief. 3 3' Essentially, child
immigrant advocates should learn from the experience of their feminist
counterparts in the international law and gender asylum law arenas and engage
in a "third world" critique of the system and then attempt to move beyond it
toward a system that individualizes a UAC's experience and recognizes the full
measure of a child's agency.

130. Uehling, supra note 18, at 837 (arguing that in the United States, "undocumented
children are simultaneously perceived as the most vulnerable of the vulnerable, and as
security risks to the United States" and that "this security has at least two dimensions: there
is the risk adolescent children pose as potential offenders or 'terrorist' elements and there is
the threat children are perceived to pose to communities' social service networks").
13 1. See, e.g., Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?, supra note 5, at 10 14-15 ("Decisions
about children's best interests should be located with independent decision makers who have
expertise in child welfare. ... Certainly children in particularly vulnerable situations need,
indeed demand, our urgent attention. But changes affecting only relatively small populations
of children are not sufficient."); see also Bhabha, supra note 5, at 274 ("Children need to
become a central focus of migration policy, not an afterthought, and active participants in
contestation over rights not invisible dependent variables, if the promise of the ambitious
normative regime is to be concretized in practice."); Carr, supra note 109, at 159 (arguing
that the best interests of the child determination is only currently available to UACs, and
calling for this approach to be used with regard to "all children directly affected by
immigration proceedings"); Young & McKenna, supra note 18, at 256-59 (recommending
government appointed counsel, the appointment of child welfare experts, elimination of all
appearances by children before the Immigration Court, and regulations which implement
juvenile dockets in every immigration court).
132. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of these models.
133. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
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USING THE UAC EXPERIENCE To REEVALUATE ATTIEMPTS TO
RECOGNIZE CHILDREN AS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS BEARERS IN
IMMIGRATION LAW

The models of liberal inclusion and structural bias critique produced
significant UAC-specific reforms in immigration law and detention policy.
Unfortunately, child advocates' failure to engage in the "third world" critique
undertaken by their counterparts in international legal feminism and gender and
asylum law allows discriminatory implementation of these reforms to go
unchecked. 134 In this setting, a "third world" critique"' 5 calls for methodological
dialogue and critique of the social constructs of childhood assigned to UACs on
the basis of gender, country of origin, and other factors. Such efforts will
undoubtedly yield a myriad of proposed methods for individualizing UACs'
immigration law and detention experience, however, this article aims to begin
the discussion by suggesting two specific starting points and calling on
advocates to investigate a third. With regard to detention policy, advocates
should update the Flores Settlement Agreement principles to limit ORR
discretion by interJecting best interests determinations, based on a specifically
defined standard, at crucial points. With regard to immigration law,
policymakers should combat the social construct of children as national
security threats or deviants through a reexamination of certain gang-based
asylum claims. Finally, advocates and policymakers should begin investigating
new ways to address the violations of UACs' economic rights, which shape the
reality of their childhoods but are not considered under the current constructs
assigned to them.
A.

Equal Treatment in Detention Policy: Towards a Best Interests Standard
that Individualizes a UAC's Experience

In crafting the Flores Settlement Agreement, child welfare advocates
improved the standard of care for UACs in immigration custody.136 However,
the social constructs assigned to UACs during their detention, on the basis of
gender, country of origin, and other factors, cause the Flores principles to be
better implemented for some UACs than for others. In order to combat this
disparity, the Flores principles should be updated by intejecting best interests
considerations at crucial points;13 7 namely, to temper the duty to reunify, to
134. For the argument that implementation of these reforms reflects a gender bias, see
supra Part lIIIA.
135. For a discussion of the third world critique undertaken by international legal
feminism and gender and asylum law, see Engle, supra note 33, at 49.

136.

See WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N,

supra note 2, at 1-3.

137. At this juncture, I note that child welfare advocates firequently call for the best
interests of the child to be taken into consideration in UAC immigration cases. However, the
call is usually for the best interests standard to be further incorporated into substantive
immigration law. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha, "Not a Sack of Potatoes" Moving and
Removing Children Across Borders, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.t. 197, 208 (2006) ("Additionally,
the absence of a 'best interest' standard as a primary consideration governing the
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temper staff reactions to incidents that may cause a step-up or step-down
transfer, and to help provide UACs with meaningful access to medical, mental
health, and legal services during the entirety of their case. In order for such best
interests considerations to be usefuil, a defined standard for "best interests"
must be adopted, and permanency planning should take a more important role
in UAC care.
Best interests determinations should be interjected into the detention
process when ORR discretion is at its peak, allowing for the social constructs to
affect decision-making. For instance, family reunification is based on a variety
of subjective factors.118 However, the best interests of the UAC are notably
absent from that list. The Field Coordinators139 exist to provide some measure
of best interests analysis, however, ORR funds their positions and their reports
are only considered "recommendations," and are not binding.140 Notably,
placement decisions affect "the child's emotional and social adjustment,
identity, and career plans."14 1 As such, ORR decisions regarding family
reunification and transfers affect more than the UAC's temporary detention
experience.
The key to making this strategy a meaningful tool for combating the social
constructs causing disparities in UAC treatment is to give content to the best
interests standard. Historically, the "broad nature of the term 'best interests of
the child,' has allowed it to be used in a standardless, highly discretionary
manner."142 A widely recognized work aiming to give shape to the standard
unaccompanied or separated alien child's inmmigration proceedings contradicts recognized
international standards for child asylum seekers."). For a variety of reasons, I contest the
idea that immigration judges and USCIS officers are appropriate adjudicators of a child's
best interests. it was, in part, a desire to keep such substantive determinations with the courts
with the most experience in that realm that led the creators of the SIJ statute to require state
juvenile courts to make best interests findings. See Theo S. Liebmann, Keeping Promises to
immigrant Youth, 29 PACE L. REV. 511, 513 (2009) (describing special immigrant juvenile
findings required of juvenile family courts as "matters within the traditional purview of
family courts"). As a result, I argue here that best interests determinations should be kept in
the realm of detention decisions, where social workers, often with advanced degrees in social
work, serve as the UAC's caseworkers.

138. See

OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESET-rLEMENT,

supra note 57, at 143 ("The ORR

releases an unaccompanied alien child (UAC) to a sponsor without unnecessary delay when
the ORR determines that the detention of an UAC is not required either to secure the UAC's
timely appearance before the DHS or the immnigration courts, or to ensure the UAC's safety
or the safety of others.").
139. See supra note I1I1 and accompanying text.
140. Id.

14 1.

RESSLER ET AL.,

supranote 17, at 187.

142. Id. at 229. One commentator argues that the "ambiguity and ambivalence that
have come to surround" the best interests standard has been codified in § 402 of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN. ALBERT J. SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN &
ANNA FREUD, THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE
256 n.6 (1996). Section 402 reads:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests
of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including: (1)
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argues that any best interests analysis should: "safeguard the child's need for
continuity of relationships," 143 "reflect the child's sense of time," 1 "4 and
"provide the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's
growth and development. 145 A complete investigation of the meaning of "best
interests of the child" is beyond the scope of this article, and is likely better
reserved for experts in a different field of academia. However, following the
model of Joseph Goldstien et al., when making reunification and transfer
decisions, ORR should prioritize stability of relationships by stressing
continuity because "children need stability of relationships for their healthy
growth and development."14 6 When continuity is not possible, ORR should, at
the very least, "act 'quickly' (in child time) to maximize each child's
opportunity either to restore stability to an existing relationship or to facilitate
the establishment of new relationships." 4 Finally, if all else fails, ORR should
simply provide "that specific placement and procedure for placement which
maximizes [the UAC 's] opportunity for being wanted and for maintaining, on a
continuous, unconditional, and pernanent basis, a relationship with at least one
adult." 148 If required to undertake such considerations, and further, to document
the analysis in a transparent, accountable way, ORR discretion at these crucial
points could be minimized, and the social constructs currently undermining
implementation of UAC detention policy could be neutralized.
Additionally, once placement decisions have been made, the competing
roles of DHS and ORR-namely, combating national security threats and
caring for vulnerable and traumatized youth-must be further separated so as to
provide UACs the utmost protection. This is especially true in a post-9/l11
world,149 because as "enforcement and immigration control concerns
increasingly dominate the policy agenda, [ ] there is growing cause for
concern." 5 0 Essentially, ORR-contracted care providers should operate under a
the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the
wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and
any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and (5)
mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998), as reprintedin id. at 256 n.6.

143.

GOLDSTEIN ET Al.,

supra note 142, at 19-40.

144. Id. at 41-45.
145. Id. at 50-61.
146. Id. at 20.
147. Id. at 42.
148. Id. at 50.
149. See Uehling, supra note 18, at 846 (noting the effect of 9/11 on "our
humanitarianism" in the realm of inmmigration).
150. Bhabha, supra note 19, at 282 (warning that the national security agenda subjects
unaccompanied minors "to harsh immigration control measures, such as threats of removal,
indefinite detention, or legal proceedings without access to professional representation,
[which leaves] their ability to articulate their views or bring best interest considerations to
the attention of decision makers . .. compromised"). Bhabha describes a situation in which,
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"generous and inclusive policy that prioritizes protection over penalty and
inclusion over exclusion."'"' Specifically, staff at each ORR-contracted care
facility should receive child welfare training, cultural sensitivity training, and
should be required to attend seminars akin to continuing education classes that
discuss the types of situations that cause UACs to migrate and the effect it can
have on their behavior, speech, and outlook. Study of the reality that UACs
experience as 'childhood" provides a significant, simple mechanism for
combating the social constructs of childhood that ORR staff and contracted
care staff assign to UACs based on gender, country of origin, and related
factors.
B.

Realizing the Full Potentialof UAG-Specific Legal Relief: Towards
Application of Substantive Law That Protects All Forms of Childhood

The constructs of childhood assigned to UACs on the basis of gender,
country of origin, and related factors undermine the even application of
immigration law, even UAC-specific legal relief, to UACs. Namely, two
problematic features of UAC-specific legal relief have been identified: the
disregard of asylum claims based on gang persecution, and the perpetual
undervaluing of economic rights.' The construction of children, especially
male UACs, as threatening and deviant renders gang-based asylum claims
essentially useless. This result ignores the reality of childhood for most of the
UACs in custody, who hail from Central America where the gang problem is
endemic.' To combat this social construct of childhood, the social visibility
test for determining a particular social group should be reevaluated with regard
to certain gang-based asylum claims.154 As to the undervaluing of a UACs'
economic rights, recognizing that asylum law cannot address every calamity,
but is rather designed as a remedy for particular types of persecution,155 this
article does not argue that asylum law should vindicate economic rights
through the definition of a social group.156 Instead, this article calls for child
as a direct result of the view of unaccompanied minors as a national security threat, "[alt
worst children are removed without any legal redress; or they abandon their claims and seek
to be returned home irrespective of the consequences because they cannot see an alternative;
alternatively they remain in the host country in a state of legal and emotional limbo." Id.
15 1. Bhabha, supra note 13 7, at 217.
152. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
153. See generally USAID, CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT
(2006),
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin -america-caribbean/democracy/gangs _assessment.pdf.
154. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
155. For an extended discussion of this viewpoint, see Matthew E. Price, Persecution

Complex: Justifying Asylum Law's Preferencefor Persecuted People, 47

HARv. INT'L L.J.

413 (2006).
156. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. For the opposite view see
generally Singh, supra note 125, at 517 (calling for an amendment to "the United States'
statutory definition of refugee to specifically conceptualize violations of children's economic
rights as persecution on the basis of membership in a particular social group").
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advocates and policy makers in Congress to investigate the reality of economic
hardship that consumes many UACs' childhood experiences and design a
program to address it.
To qualify for asylum, an applicant must have suffered persecution on the
basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. 57 Circuit courts repeatedly find against gang-related asylum
claims because the proposed particular social group lacks social visibility.'5
Such decisions generally argue that society cannot discern outward
characteristics of a person reflecting membership in, for example, the particular
social group "former gang members" or "young boys who resist gang
recruitment." 5 9 Unfortunately, this analysis addresses social visibility from the
viewpoint of a member of U.S. society, who, indeed, may or may not know
which youth are former members and which are current members. In the rural
communities of many Central American countries, however, such information
is widely known and the same "social visibility" rational just simply does not
apply. 60
1 The underlying incongruence directly results from the misconstrued
constructs of childhood imposed on foreign UAC asylum applicants, which
assumes that a UAC's childhood either mirrors that of the average childhood in
the United States, or involves a childhood of either victimization or of
deviance. Gang-based asylum claims are held up against the average U.S.
childhood construct and when they do not align, the analysis tips in favor of
assigning a construct of deviance rather than a construct of victimization.
One recent Seventh Circuit case seems to eschew this framework and
instead recognizes "former gang membership" as a social group despite
arguments regarding lack of social visibility.'16' Specifically, Judge Richard
Posner held that a "gang is a group, and being a former member of a group is a

characteristic impossible to change, except perhaps by rejoining the group.,,

62

Thus, Posner's opinion held that membership in the group "former gang
members" met the definition of social group set out in case law.' 63 Importantly,
this decision recognizes the reality of the Central American situation.' 6 Indeed,
157. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(42)(A), 1 158(b)(1), 123 l(b)(3) (2006).
158. See, e.g., Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009); Scatambuli
v. Holder,
159.
160.
161.

558 F.3d 53, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2009).
S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579, 583 (B.I.A. 2008).
Affidavit of Ernesto Bardales 118 (on file with author).
Benitiz Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009).

162. Id. at 429.
163. Id. at 436. Case law defines a social group as one whose members share
"conmmon characteristics that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because such characteristics are fundamental to their identities." Cf.
Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996); Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34
(B.IA. 1985).
164. For a discussion of the situation of gang violence in Central America, see
generally, e.g., CLARE RIISANDO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GANGS INJCENTRAL AmERICA
(2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47 140.pdf, CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE,
CONG.
RESEARCH
SERV.,
GANGS
FN
CENTRAL
AMERICA
(2008),
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recognizing former gang membership as a social group could even promote
national security interests in so far as it incentivizes youth to disassociate with
gangs. In opening space for some gang-based asylum claims, immigration law
could both combat the current set of social constructs imposed on UACs fleeing
gang persecution (one of deviance), and simultaneously combat gangs, a
perceived national security threat.
With regard to the undervaluing of UAC's economic rights, the current
substantive immigration legal framework simply does not provide space for the
vindication of these rights.16' Asylum law's "membership in a particular social
group" cannot serve as a catch all provision through which all reasons for
66
transnational migration are boot-strapped to claims of persecution.1
Furthermore, traditional definitions of "neglect" in the family court setting
rightly defer to a parent's struggle to provide for their children such that
poverty alone does not constitute neglect under most state dependency
statutes.16 7 As such, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status does not provide a
proper forum for vindication of economic rights. Instead, a wholly new form of
UAC-specific legal relief seems necessary to address the reality of economic
hardship that consumes much of UACs' childhoods. Whether that relief takes
the form of a new temporary work program for youth, a path to permanent
residency, Or intensive out-of-country development programs is beyond the
scope of this article. However, this article does raise a call to advocates and
policy makers to systematically investigate the economic rights violations of
UACs in their countries of origin and craft a plan of action to address their "lost
childhoods."
CONCLUSION

Child welfare advocates have made excellent strides in improving
detention policy and immigration law for UACs. However, in order to
progressively advance the rights of children in immigration law generally, and
to provide even UACs meaningful enjoyment of the rights that child welfare
advocates obtained for them, those same advocates must move beyond the
liberal inclusion and structural bias critique models of advocacy and begin to
combat the social constructs imposed on UACs during the pendency of their
immigration proceedings. Essentially, advocates must proceed with the third
phase embraced by their international legal feminists and gender and asylum
http://opencrs.com/document/RL34 112/2008-10-1 7/download/I1013/;

INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS
CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH., No PLACE To HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE
IN
EL
SALVADOR
(2007),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/
FinalElSalvadorReport(3-6-07).pdf-, USAID, supra note 153; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN
AMER-ICA, CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED ASYLUM: A RESOURCE GUIDE, 3 (2008),

http://www.wola.org/popup englishtext.php?page=http /3A//www.wola.org/media/Gangs/
WOLA -GangAsylum Guide.pdf.
165. See Singh, supra note 125, at 519-25.
166. See generally Price. supra note 155.
167. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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law counterparts-a "third world" critique that identifies and reveals the reality
of childhoods all over the world and uses that reality to combat the myths of
childhood that United States immigration, law and detention policy prefer to
protect. Only a shift in the advocacy paradigm will allow the reforms obtained
thus far to affect the change that advocates desire: recognition and
empowerment of UACs' agency in the migration process and in the laws and
procedures that shape that process.

